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Abstract 
Some economists in the Austrian tradition interpret the Arrow Impossibility Theorem (AIT) as 
support for their laissez-faire standpoint.  They presume that the AIT cannot be applied in market 
settings, but in the context of voting, it adds weight to their arguments against the possibility of 
socialism and planning.  The examples of Boettke (2001) and Boettke and Leeson (2002) are taken as 
examples.  It is shown that their stance is founded on a misinterpretation of Arrow, and no 
compelling case for exempting markets from the AIT is found.  The Austrian writers draw on 
Buchanan’s critique of Arrow, which critique is in turn shown to be faulty and unreliable.  Finally a 
possible avenue for future Austrian research is identified, showing that the AIT might not apply to 
markets. 
 
1. Introduction  
Peter Boettke, an economist in the Austrian tradition, interprets the Arrow Impossibility Theorem 
(AIT) as support for the Austrian laissez-faire standpoint.  That is, he regards the AIT as condemning 
planning as inconsistent, unless managed by a dictator, while the market mechanism is left 
untouched by the theorem.  AIT, in this interpretation, therefore fits nicely into the socialist 
calculation debate, supporting the Austrian contention of the impossibility of socialism.  This paper 
appraises the grounds for this approach.  Ultimately, this interpretation finds its roots in work by 
Buchanan, and the paper also addresses Buchanan’s critique of the Arrow theorem.  The paper finds 
that Buchanan’s view, and the Austrian work drawing on it, cannot be relied upon to underpin the 
interpretation that AIT undermines planning while leaving the market unscathed.  Nevertheless, a 
basis does seem to exist for claiming that the market mechanism is exempt from the scope of the 
AIT critique, and the paper identifies an opportunity for further work in this area.   
The next section sets out some occasions in which Boettke has adopted the stance that AIT, correctly 
interpreted, undermines planning but not the price mechanism, along with the prima facie evidence 
that that was not at all Arrow’s view of what he was doing.  Section 3 sets out a brief statement of 
the Arrow theorem.  Section 4 appraises the arguments put forward for the Austrian view of the AIT.  
Section 5 investigates the roots of that approach in the work of James Buchanan.  Section 6 sketches 
an argument for the Austrian view of Arrow which might be attractive for further work.  Section 7 
concludes.   
 
2. Boettke and Arrow 
Peter Boettke writes 
The Arrow theorem … could be reinterpreted as an application of Mises’ impossibility thesis 
to non-market decision-making via democratic voting. In the absence of the price system, 
actors would confront a set of incoherent signals about how they should orient their 
behavior … as Arrow demonstrated … majority-rule pairwise voting might not produce the 
required agreement (a highly formal result which echoes Hayek’s discussion of limits of 
democratically derived agreement in The Road to Serfdom). (Boettke, 2001: 60)   
Again:  
In the face of market failure, Arrow asked, was there a democratic collective choice 
mechanism that was capable of allocating scarce resources efficiently.  The inability to 
unambiguously aggregate preferences across voters led to a negative answer.  Whatever 
collective choice mechanism we choose will be imperfect.  Collective choice can be efficient 
but dictatorial, or it can be democratic but inefficient. (Boettke, 2001: 196)  
The message is clear: the Arrow theorem is about non-market decision-making, about how we cope 
in the absence of markets, or when  markets fail.  “Collective choice” here excludes choice via the 
price mechanism.  In the case of the first passage, we are not referred to any previous literature 
explaining this interpretation.  The second passage is accompanied by several paragraphs of 
discussion of Arrow’s work, but this does not extend to justifying the claim that AIT is about political 
rather than economic choice: this is simply assumed throughout.   
Boettke and Leeson (2002) correctly starts from Arrow’s (SCIV: 2) opening statement that a dictator 
can be rational in the sense that any individual can be rational, “But Arrow wanted to figure out 
whether the market and voting can make the same claim to rationality” (B&L: 14).  For several pages 
thereafter, the attention is exclusively on voting and makes much of the paradox of voting.  This is 
odd, as the paradox of voting was known long before Arrow – both Condorcet and Charles Dodgson 
wrote about it.  B&L summarise the discussion saying that “Arrow is led to a conclusion that either 
collective choices are democratic, but irrational, or they are rational, but dictatorial.” (B&L: 15).  
Nothing in the text would lead the reader to imagine that “collective choice” referred to market 
mechanisms as much as non-market ones.  B&L cite Buchanan saying, in a private letter, “Clearly, if 
we cannot aggregate individual preferences … socialism is impossible” (18).  They B&L describe this 
as an “implication of Arrow’s paradox”.  Later in the paper, B&L present an argument that separating 
market and non-market mechanisms in the consideration of the AIT in this way is an appropriate 
stance, and that argument will be considered in a subsequent section.  B&L conclude their argument 
by wondering why Mises and Hayek “did not pick up Arrow’s argument … after it appeared in the 
early 50s to help bolster their claims” (20).   
To regard the AIT as undermining planning, while leaving market mechanisms unchallenged, is 
surprising.  It is certainly not what Arrow thought he was doing: “In the following discussion of the 
consistency of various value judgements as to the mode of social choice, the distinction between 
voting and the market mechanism will be disregarded, both being regarded as special cases of the 
more general category of collective social choice” (Arrow, 1963: 5).  Right at the start he says that 
“The methods of voting and the market … are methods of amalgamating the tastes of many 
individuals in the making of social choices” and ““The formal existence of methods of aggregating 
individual choices [is] the problem posed in this study” (Arrow, 1963: 2).  In the additional chapter, 
added for the 1963 edition, Arrow comments that “Since the market mechanism does satisfy the 
Condition of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, it must violate another condition, which is 
clearly that of Collective Rationality” (Arrow, 1963: 110 n 50).  The only reason for saying that if the 
market mechanism satisfied one condition if must violate on of the others, is that it is subject to the 
AIT.  The ‘General Possibility Theorem’, or AIT, is summarised in Theorem 2 (Arrow, 1963: 59).  
Arrow writes: “Theorem 2 shows that … there is no method of voting which will remove the paradox 
of voting … Similarly, the market mechanism does not create a rational social choice.” (Arrow, 1963: 
59).  Arrow is thus explicit that AIT applies equally to market and non-market settings.  Even if Arrow 
were less clear, regardless of what he thought he was doing, it is the case that the proof of the 
theorem makes no reference to market or non-market modes of choice, and there is thus a strong 
default for regarding AIT as equally true of either.   
 
3. The Arrow Theorem1 
 
a. The conditions 
Arrow’s theorem says that no social choice procedure can exist which satisfies the five conditions O, 
U, P, D and I.  The argument proceeds via a reductio ad absurdam: we assume that all the conditions 
hold and then demonstrate that they lead to a contradiction.  Relaxing any of the conditions removes 
the impossibility of deriving a SWF, but, in general, such SWFs will exhibit perverse features.  The 
conditions are expressed in many different ways in the literature and what follows is based on the 
editors’ introductory essay, “Individual Preferences and Collective Decisions”, to Part II of Barry and 
Hardin (1982: 213-228).  The five conditions are as follows:   
Condition O: The SWF is a unique Ordering of the alternatives facing society based only on 
individual orderings.  An ordering is a consistent ranking.  In particular this implies transitivity for 
both preference and indifference.  If society prefers x to y and y to z, then it prefers x to z, and so on.  
It also requires that the SWF is complete (or connected) – that is, that every possible social state is 
ranked against every other state:x,y, x ≻ y, y ≻ x, or x  y.   
Condition U: The social choice rule must have Unrestricted domain: it must work for every logically 
possible combination of individual orderings.   
Condition P: The social choice rule must be Pareto-efficient: if one individual prefers x to y and all 
other individuals either prefer x to y or are indifferent between x and y, then the SWF must prefer x to 
y.   
Condition D: There must not be a Dictator, that is, a person whose preference of x for y is always (in 
every logically conceivable constellation of preferences) the social preference, for any x and y, 
regardless of the preferences of others.   
Condition I: The social ordering of any pair of alternatives x and y is a function solely of the 
individual orderings of x and y: it is Independent of irrelevant alternatives – individual orderings of x 
and z, for example.   
b. Proof of the theorem 
One further concept is needed: that of decisiveness.  If a group or individual is decisive over x and y, 
and prefers x to y, then society prefers x to y, whatever anyone else’s preference may be.  We also 
assume that society consists of a finite number of individuals.  The proof then proceeds by showing 
that (a) if there is an SWF which satisfies conditions O, U, P, and I (that is, all except non-dictatorship), 
then for some constellation of preferences there must be a decisive individual, and (b) if there is a 
decisive individual then he is a dictator.   
Consider any pair of alternatives, x and y, where society prefers x to y.  It cannot be the case that 
everyone in society prefers y to x, by condition P (Pareto).  There must be a set of decisive individuals.  
If only one person prefers x then the set only contains one person; if everyone prefers x then the set 
of all the individuals in society is decisive.  Normally, it will be a set of intermediate size, but that is 
irrelevant.  There will thus be a (non-empty) decisive set for each pair of alternatives where society is 
not indifferent between the two.  Consider the set of all of these decisive sets.  From the assumption 
that society consisted of a finite number of individuals, this set of decisive sets must have a smallest 
member, or a subset of equally large smallest members, in which case we pick any member of this 
subset.  We can show that there must be a possible pattern of preferences for which this smallest set 
of decisive individuals has only one member. 
We will suppose initially that this smallest decisive set, V, has more than one member, and show that 
this leads to a contradiction.  Suppose V is decisive over x and y, and that it (and hence society – 
because V is decisive) prefers x to y.  This must lead to a contradiction.  Since it consists of more than 
one member we can divide it into two parts, one, V1, consisting of one member and the other, V2, 
consisting of all the other members of V.  We also give the name V3 to the set of all the members of 
society not in V.  Condition U, unlimited domain, tells us that the SWF must work for any logically 
possible pattern of preferences.  So we can pick any pattern of preferences we like.  Suppose the 
pattern of preferences is that for V1, x ≻ y ≻ z, for V2, z ≻ x ≻ y, and for V3, y ≻ z ≻ x.  For ease of 
reference this pattern is set out in the table below. 
Table 1: Preferences of the three sets of agents, V1, V2 and V3 
Rank V1 V2 V3 S S' 
1 X z y x x 
2 Y x z y 
} y, z 3 Z y x z 
Now, we know that V is decisive over x and y, so for society x ≻ y.  This is shown in the column headed 
S.  But where does society rank z?  Suppose society preferred z to y.  Only V2 prefers z to y – both V1 
and V3 prefer y to z – so that would make V2 decisive.  But V2 is one person less than V, the smallest 
decisive set, so that is not possible.  So society either prefers y to z (Column S) or is indifferent between 
y and z (Column S').  Hence society must prefer x to z, given x ≻ y and y ≽ z, by transitivity (condition 
O).  These two alternatives, x ≻ y ≻ z, and x ≻ y ∼ z, are shown in columns S and S', respectively, of 
Table 3.  But now V1 is decisive since both V2 and V3 prefer z to x.  However, V1 consists of only one 
person, so the assumption that the smallest decisive set, V, consisted of more than one person turns 
out to be self-contradictory.  We have shown, therefore, what was required, that there is a pattern of 
possible preferences such that there is a decisive individual.  That completes the first part of the proof.   
The second part of the proof shows that a decisive individual is a dictator.  Suppose A is decisive for x 
against y and that he also prefers x to z.  Also suppose, invoking condition U, that everyone prefers y 
to z.  Condition P says that society prefers y to z.  If every individual prefers y to z, it would certainly be 
Pareto-inefficient for the SWF to prefer z to y, or even to be indifferent between them.  Hence, x ≻ y 
≻ z for society and so, invoking transitivity, x ≻ z.  But condition I, independence of irrelevant 
alternatives, says that the social choice between x and z is independent of individual preferences over 
y.  Hence, regardless of others’ preferences, x is preferred to z by society if and only if A prefers x to z.  
Hence, if A is decisive for x against y, we can replace y by any other alternative which A finds less 
desirable than x.  Similarly we can replace x by any alternative which A finds more desirable than y.  
Hence for any possible pair of alternatives, A’s preference is decisive: he is a dictator.  But the first part 
of the proof showed that there was a possible set of preferences such that there was decisive 
individual.  Hence, for this pattern of preferences there is a dictator.  But this violates condition D, of 
non-dictatorship.  The concept of an SWF which simultaneously satisfies all five conditions is therefore 
inconsistent. 
What this shows is that there is a possible pattern of individual preference orderings such that a social 
ordering derived from them which satisfies the Pareto and Independence conditions must be 
dictatorial if it is to be consistent. 
 
4. The argument for treating market and non-market mechanisms differently  
Boettke and Leeson (2002) begin their discussion by confirming that ““Arrow assumed away the 
differences between markets and voting because both were being treated as special cases of the 
more general case of social choice … In Arrow’s analysis, neither the market mechanism nor the 
voting booth can amalgamate the tastes of many individuals in such a way that we can meaningfully 
define a social welfare function” (2002: 16).  There are some minor misunderstandings in the 
subsequent discussion.  In a diagram of a two-dimensional production possibility frontier, the 
community indifference curve drawn tangent to it is labelled “Social Welfare Function”, and they say 
that “For Arrow, both market and voting fail to aggregate preferences into a coherent social welfare 
function” (17).  A social welfare function (SWF), in Arrow’s account, is the mechanism for 
aggregating preferences, such as voting or the market mechanism, not the order which emerges 
from that mechanism.  Nevertheless, these are not critical to their account and can be placed on one 
side.   
Boettke and Leeson believe that “Arrow mischaracterised the situation” (17).  By “[t]reating the 
economic problem as a planning problem” Arrow “draws our analytical attention away from how the 
entrepreneurial market process coordinates the decisions within the market so that they tend to 
realize the mutual gains from trade.” (17)  In itself, this is a very weak opening.  It says no more than 
that we should focus on the role of the market process as a coordination mechanism and the gains 
from trade which it allows to be realised, instead of treating the market as a planning problem.  But 
for this argument to work, we would need much more information.  In particular, what is the 
evidence for the claim that Arrow treats the market process as a planning problem, and exactly how 
does that vitiate his account?  B&L are silent on this.  Treating the market as a coordination device 
which realises gains to trade sounds highly uncontentious.  It is for B&L to explain how that would 
produce a different result from Arrow’s.  Specifically, how would it remove the market from the field 
of application of the AIT, while retaining the validity of AIT as far as planning is concerned?  At this 
point, B&L draw on the work of James Buchanan.  Buchanan’s critique of the Arrow Theorem will be 
considered in a subsequent section.     
The final paragraph of the final substantial section of their article (pp 19-20) spells out the case for 
considering Arrow’s consequences for planning but not for markets.  As well as being extremely 
brief, their argument is cloudy, but it appears to be that a rational SWF function is a precondition for 
planning but not for markets:  
 
[s]ince the ex ante existence of a meaningful and stable social welfare function is necessary 
for the operation of market socialism and Arrow demonstrated that no such social welfare 
function can be arrived at, market socialism is not a viable economic arrangement. Unlike for 
market socialism, the existence of a stable social welfare function is not necessary for the 
operation of the market. (19)  
 
Alas, B&L offer no argument to support either of these claims.  The claims are in any event rather 
strange, and suggest some confusion as to what the AIT is about.  What it is not about is the bare 
possibility of any particular kind of SWF – market, planning, or some mixture of the two.  Rather it is 
about the possibility of any such SWF issuing in an ordering, that is, a transitive enumeration of the 
possible states between which we must choose, subject to the conditions of non-dictatorship, 
independence of irrelevant alternatives, Pareto efficiency, and universal domain.  B&L talk of 
socialism and markets as requiring ‘ex ante’ a ‘meaningful’ SWF.  But as pointed out before, it is the 
market or planning mechanism which is the SWF.  Perhaps what they mean is the order of 
alternatives issuing from the SWF mechanism.  But it is impossible for an ordering to emerge prior to 
the institution of the SWF that it will emerge from, so this seems very confused.  Perhaps they mean 
that someone has to be able to write down a description of a SWF before implementing it in the case 
of planning, while they don’t need to in the case of markets.  It is difficult to see why, and more 
difficult to see what the point of the argument is.  All this discussion of what is necessary ‘ex ante’ 
really makes little sense.  That is not what the Arrow Theorem is about.  In the account of B&L, we 
cannot have planning because it requires ex ante a ‘meaningful’ SWF – presumably one which 
satisfies the five conditions – and that’s impossible from the AIT.  Meanwhile, we can have markets 
because they do not – ex ante – require a satisfactory SWF.  Well, of course, as far as existence is 
concerned, we can see markets every day, and planning has taken place on many occasions: in most 
places the mode of making these social decisions is a mix of the two.  So both are possible.  But what 
Arrow has shown is that they cannot be satisfactory, if by that we mean, simultaneously satisfying 
the five conditions.  B&L have given us no grounds for believing that the AIT applies any differently 
to market and non-market SWFs.   
 
In contrast to the “ex ante” discussion of planning, B&L claim that “The social welfare function 
maximization is at best an ex post representation of an outcome that the market already achieved … 
[AIT] merely raises doubts about the appropriateness of a particular ex post characterization of the 
market process” (19-20).  It is difficult to interpret these remarks.  We are considering two kinds of 
SWF, market and non-market.  Most systems in reality are mixtures of the two, but it is useful to 
consider them as poles of a spectrum.  They are modes of aggregating individual preferences to 
generate an order of the social alternatives between which we must choose.  They are not before or 
after anything; in particular, they are not ex ante plans for anything or ex post characterisations of 
anything.  (They are thing which B&L wish to plan for, the thing which they wish to characterise.)  
But we can ask whether this SWF, say, the market, or this other SWF, say planning, satisfies our 
criteria for a socially desirable SWF.  Arrow’s answer in both cases is no.  B&L have given us no 
cogent reason for varying Arrow’s opinion.  This does not necessarily mean that no such reason 
exists.  A subsequent section will explore one possibility.   
 
5. Buchanan’s response to the Arrow Theorem 
B&L draw on Buchanan’s (1954a: 17-19) criticisms of the Arrow Theorem, and Boettke (private 
communication) underlines the necessity of consulting Buchanan’s paper to understand the point 
that the Arrow theorem may be applied to planning but not markets.  This section addresses 
Buchanan’s critique and the subsequent use made of it2.  I argue that no weight should be attached 
to Buchanan’s analysis of the AIT as it is characterised by misunderstanding and misrepresentation, 
and in general a failure to engage with what Arrow is saying.   
Buchanan starts the paper with some very strong statements as to what it achieves.  His approach 
“reveals a weakness in the formal analysis itself and demonstrates that some of the more significant 
implications drawn from his [Arrow’s] analysis are inappropriate” (1954a: 114).  His conclusions are 
that the paradox of voting is a feature, not a bug, and more importantly, that  
the voting process is fundamentally different from the market when the two are considered 
as decision-making processes rather than as bases for deriving social welfare functions. Here 
it will be demonstrated that the market does produce consistent choices and that the 
market does not belong in the category of collective choice at all. (114) 
Buchanan begins the analysis by repeating Arrow’s terminology, contained in Arrow’s Definition 4 
(Arrow, 1963: 23): “By a social welfare function will be meant a process or rule, for each set of 
individual orderings … for alternative social states … states a corresponding social ordering of 
alternative states.”  This terminology, Buchanan believes, is “singularly unfortunate” and “the source 
of the confusion” in Arrow.  What confusion?  That “between the definition of the social welfare 
function and the actual processes of choice: voting and the market” (Buchanan, 1954a: 114-115).  
But the confusion on this is one entirely manufactured by Buchanan: the SWF is the “actual process 
of choice”.  By defining one, you necessarily define the other.  Despite Arrow having said this in the 
clearest possible terms, Buchanan finds it necessary to introduce a distinction, such that these terms 
will no longer mean what Arrow meant by them.  He immediately draws the consequence of his 
terminological adjustment: “As will be shown in this paper, the decision-making process may 
produce consistent choice, even though the rule which states the social ordering from the individual 
values may not exist” (Buchanan, 1954a: 115).  So Buchanan’s protest is that the SWF, the market or 
planning process, should be considered both as a rule or programme for doing something, and as the 
implementation of that rule in some sequence of actions.  But if the process which takes as inputs 
the individual orderings and produces as output the social ordering, if that process is regular, lawful, 
then a rule or law exists, whether we happen to know what it is or not.  The process is the rule or 
law in action.  There cannot be lawful decision-making process for which the rule may not exist.   
Buchanan summarises the Conditions and sets out Arrow’s conclusions.  He then adds “But Arrow 
extends the argument to say that these ordinary decision-making mechanisms do not allow rational 
social choice. Now this is a horse of quite a different color, with which the Arrow argument should 
not legitimately concern itself at all” (Buchanan, 1954a: 115).  This is a very strange comment to 
make, as, of course, it is the rationality of the social ordering emerging from any SWF whatever, 
which is at the heart of the problem Arrow is addressing.  Why on Earth should Arrow not concern 
himself with it?  The reason soon becomes clear.  He is failing to understand the term rationality in 
the very precise and minimal sense which Arrow unambiguously gives it.  This is not from ignorance.  
On other occasions Buchanan treats rationality in exactly the same way as Arrow does.  In his paper 
on “Individual Choice in Voting and the Market” which appeared in the JPE later the same year, he 
refers in the text to “rationality in individual behavior” and explains in a footnote that “Rationality in 
individual behavior is defined in the normal manner, that is, the individual is able to rank 
alternatives, and such ranking is transitive” (Buchanan, 1954b: 341 and n 23).  But here he takes 
issue with Arrow for referring to rationality and makes it mean something opaque and mystical.   
Section II of the paper is on “The Concept of Social Rationality”.  It starts with the claim that “It is 
difficult to know exactly what is meant by "rational social choice" in the Arrow analysis” (Buchanan, 
1954a: 116).  This is surprising as the definition of rationality is simple and stated unambiguously at 
an early stage (Arrow, 1963: 2-3).  It is that decision-making is consistent, and that implies 
transitivity.  So what is Buchanan getting at?  “The mere introduction of the idea of social rationality 
suggests the fundamental philosophical issues involved. Rationality or irrationality as an attribute of 
the social group implies the imputation to that group of an organic existence apart from that of its 
individual components.”  This is wholly untrue.  We are not discussing the rationality of the social 
group as an organic entity, we are discussing the ordering of alternative states which has emerged 
from the SWF, and asking whether it is consistent, whether indeed it is an ordering.  These 
philosophical musings are utterly misplaced.  Their function is to undermine Arrow without engaging 
with what Arrow says: “if the idea of acceptable social welfare functions and of social or collective 
rationality is completely divorced from the decision-making processes of the group, what is there 
left of the Arrow analysis?” (Buchanan, 1954a: 118).  Indeed.  If we are compelled to consider the 
decision-making processes of society without asking whether they can be relied upon to generate an 
ordering, then nothing is left of the AIT.   
Undermining everything he has said up to this point, Buchanan now admits that our ordinary 
understanding of rationality can be applied, but does so as if he is passing on to another aspect of 
Arrow’s argument:  
It is still possible to test these processes for consistency; but consistency or rationality in this 
sense must … be defined in terms of satisfying "the condition of rationality, as we ordinarily 
understand it.’ [Arrow, 1963: 3] This implies only that choices can be made (are connected) 
and that the choices are transitive.” (Buchanan, 1954a: 118) 
Buchanan complains of the lack of the “time dimension” in Arrow’s presentation (118-9).  He says 
that the violation of transitivity in the SWF, and the consequent paradox of voting, far from being a 
bug, is a feature.  That A is preferred to B, B to C, and C to A, allows provisional, temporary decisions 
to be made, rather than the definite and irreversible decision which would be taken in its absence.  
The latter would be a dictatorship of the majority.  So the intransitivity allows the debate to 
continue, and further steps towards consensus to be taken.  This is a confusion.  In the Arrow 
Theorem, the choice emerging from the SWF is a ranking of states of the world that we can achieve 
today by some possible set of actions.  There is nothing to say that we will make corresponding 
choices tomorrow, when new knowledge is available, as to the costs and benefits of the states then 
available, and as to our own preferences regarding the choices then to be made.  That is as true 
whether the choice emerging from the SWF is deficient in some respect – violating rationality or any 
of the other conditions – or not.   JMB is not comparing like with like.  The question we are to 
address is not what will keep the issue from final settlement, but what the properties will be of the 
choice we make today.  We should prefer a rational choice to an irrational one, that is an ordering to 
a list of alternatives that lacks transitivity.   
Section IV “Collective Choice and Free Markets” (Buchanan, 1954a: 121-122) deals specifically with 
the claim that the Arrow theorem cannot be applied to market settings.  Buchanan bases his analysis 
on a misreading of Arrow.  A SWF depends on translating “individual values into social building 
blocks. If these values consist only of individual orderings of social states … this step cannot be 
taken” (Buchanan, 1954a: 122).  This, he says is “clearly revealed” in Arrow’s statement that  
 
“The relation of known preference or indifference is clearly transitive, but it is not connected 
since, for example, it does not tell us how the individual compares two social alternatives, 
one of which yields him more of one commodity than the second, while the second yields 
him more of a second commodity than the first.”  (Arrow, 1963: 61; Buchanan’s italics).   
 
But this is a complete misreading of Arrow.  The “known preference relation” is something that 
Arrow introduces to deal with the case of imposing certain conditions on the individual preference 
scales.  These conditions are known as “the individualistic assumptions”.  Arrow has set out the AIT 
in the preceding chapters and now wishes to explore the effect of relaxing the conditions in various 
ways.  In this chapter he relaxes the universal domain condition, and places a restriction on the 
individual rankings of alternatives.  The “individualist assumptions” are that (a) the individual only 
discriminates between the alternatives on the criteria of commodities he receives (including leisure 
and saving) in each; and (b) in any comparison of two states, in which he has more of one 
commodity in one and the same of every other commodity in both, then he prefers the former.  
Arrow shows that the known preference relation is transitive but incomplete, as we do not know 
whether the individual prefers a state with more of one commodity to one with more of another, 
everything else held constant.  The relation of known preference is a quasi-ordering.  Arrow then 
shows that AIT still applies.  So known preference is a special case.  Its incompleteness tells us 
nothing about the completeness of the individual’s true preference scale.  If Buchanan were to refer 
to the individual orderings considered in the rest of Arrow’s book, which do not have this restriction, 
then his argument would be reversed: because they are orderings, that is, both complete (ie 
connected) and transitive, the step of going from individual orderings to a social ordering is possible.   
 
Unfortunately, in this section Buchanan gives no further argument as to why we should consider the 
market exempt from the AIT.  His final remark summarises his helplessness: “the market does not 
call upon individuals to make a decision collectively at all. This being the case, market choice is just 
as consistent as, and no more consistent than, the individual choice of which it is composed.”  But 
this is simply to assert without argument that Arrow is wrong.  On the contrary, when individuals act 
in their own interests in the market place, they without knowing or willing it make a collective 
decision.  The allocation of resources which emerges is the collective decision which they have 
made.  Is this this decision consistent – “as consistent as … the individual choice of which it is 
composed”?  Arrow says no: even if the individual decisions are guaranteed to be an ordering, the 
social choice might not be.  Buchanan has given us no reason to doubt that.   
 
It is worth concluding this section by reminding readers that Arrow was able to comment on 
Buchanan’s paper in his commentary appended to the 1963 edition of his book.  He says that the 
criticisms of the AIT, specifically including Buchanan’s “are based on misunderstandings of my 
position and indeed of the full implications of the critics’ own positive views” (Arrow, 1963: 103).   
 
Where Bergson, Little and I seek in varying ways to explicate the notion of social welfare in 
operational terms, Buchanan’s positivism is more extreme.  Choice is only individual; the 
very concept of social welfare is inadmissible, and my use of the term “collective rationality” 
(by which I meant that social choices corresponding to any given set of individual orderings 
were so interrelated as to satisfy the definition of an ordering) was strongly attacked on the 
ground that only individuals can be rational.  Nevertheless, Buchanan and Tullock [in The 
Calculus of Consent] do put great stress on the selection of a constitution as the central step 
in developing a social choice mechanism. (Arrow, 1963: 107-8) 
The point being that a constitution is a set of restrictions on what we decide to regard as legitimate 
modes of social choice.   
This section has found that no weight can be attached to Buchanan’s analysis when we interpret 
Arrow’s theorem.  Nevertheless, this does not mean that there is no possible account which allows a 
separate treatment of market and non-market SWFs.  A subsequent section sketches one possible 
approach.   
 
6. A possible challenge to some of Arrow’s conclusions 
Market-favourable (for example, Austrian) writers, and market-sceptical (socialist, or in American 
English, ‘liberal’) writers, should both find the Arrow theorem disquieting.  The first group, because 
the AIT says that markets must violate what seem to be natural and minimal requirements for a 
satisfactory mode of social choice, and the second group, because planning suffers a similar fate.  It 
is of interest to ask how the Arrow Theorem might be adapted or challenged in order to relieve the 
distress of one group or the other.  The present paper is concerned with Austrian interpretations of 
Arrow, so we will focus on that, though with an occasional remark about the socialist side.  I stress 
that this is entirely speculative: I am suggesting an avenue which Austrians may wish to explore.  I 
am not making any positive assertions.   
If the goal is to look for weaknesses in Arrow’s argument so far as the market mechanism is 
concerned, a promising starting point would lie in the assumption of ordinal preferences: the proof 
of the AIT depends entirely on ordinal preferences.  As soon as any element of cardinality is 
admitted, the proof fails.  Does leave us with any wiggle room?  At first blush this might not seem 
attractive.  Is it not the case that market transactions can only ever express ordinal preferences, 
while voting systems – such as Borda count systems – can express intensity as well as rank?  If so the 
AIT applies necessarily to market modes of social choice, but not necessarily to non-market modes, if 
the latter impound anything more than purely ordinal preferences.  The natural conclusion would be 
that the AIT thus says exactly the opposite of what the Austrians claim: market methods of 
preference aggregation cannot work for all possible constellations of preferences, while no such 
statement can be made about non-market methods.  This warrants closer inspection.  The insights of 
previous Austrian writers provide assistance.   
In view of Austrian insistence on subjectivity, it is worth reminding ourselves that Austrian thought is 
built on an understanding of subjective use-value, or utility, and objective exchange-value, or prices.  
For Mises, in Socialism. An Economic and Sociological Analysis, “[i]n an exchange economy, the 
objective exchange value of commodities becomes the unit of calculation … The subjective valuation 
of one individual is not directly comparable with the subjective valuation of others.  It only becomes 
so as an exchange value arising from the interplay of subjective valuations” (Mises, 1951: 115; a very 
similar formulation appears in Mises, 1935: 97).  Later in the same work he refers to the necessity, 
for economic calculation, of “an objective recognizable unit of value which would enable economic 
calculations to be made” (Mises, 1951: 135; again a similar formulation appears in Mises, 1935: 116).   
A consequence of this is that these subjective utilities are essentially ordinal – the individual is able 
to compare states, and to prefer one to the other, or be indifferent between them, but nothing can 
be said about intensity: about how much the individual prefers A to B, or about interpersonal 
comparison: about how much utility individual 1 derives from a state relative to individual 2.  But the 
prices which emerge from the interplay of individuals trading in the market place are objective: that 
is, they are cardinal numbers3 which express not only an ordinal ranking, but intensity and 
interpersonal comparisons as well.  Joseph Salerno has supplied a Postscript to Mises’s economic 
calculation essay in which he restates Mises’s argument.  He explains that  
What is needed, then, to produce the cardinal numbers necessary for computing the costs 
and benefits of production processes is what Mises calls the “intellectual division of labor” 
which emerges when private property owners are at liberty to exchange goods and services 
against money according to their individual value judgments and price appraisements … In 
their consumer roles, all people make monetary bids for the existing stocks of final goods 
according to their subjective valuations, leading to the emergence of objective monetary 
exchange ratios which relate the values of all consumer goods to one another … There thus 
comes into being the market’s monetary price structure, a genuinely “social” phenomenon 
in which every unit of exchangeable goods and services is assigned a socially significant 
cardinal number. (Salerno, 1990: 52-3) 
This understanding, that objective exchange values are socially significant cardinal numbers will be 
of the greatest importance when we ask about the negative appraisal of market mechanisms implied 
by the AIT.  Arrow repeatedly states that the analysis is based on the assumption of ordinal utilities.  
At the outset he says 
Even if, for some reason, we should admit the measurability of utility for an individual, there 
still remains the question of aggregating the individual utilities.  At best, it is contended that, 
for an individual, his utility function is uniquely determined up to a linear transformation; we 
must still choose one out of the infinite family of indicators to represent the individual, and 
the values of the aggregate (say a sum) are dependent on how the choice is made for each 
individual.  In general, there seems to be no method intrinsic to utility measurement which 
will make the choices compatible.  It requires a definite value judgment not derivable from 
individual sensations to make the utilities of different individuals dimensionally compatible 
and still a further value judgment to aggregate them according to any particular 
mathematical formula … it seems to make no sense to add the utility of one individual, a 
psychic magnitude in his mind with the utility of another individual … We will therefore 
assume throughout this book that the behavior of an individual in making choices is 
describable by means of a preference scale without any cardinal significance, either 
individual or interpersonal.  (Arrow, 1963: 10-11) 
The assumption of cardinal utilities, unattractive as it is, for the reasons Arrow states, would 
therefore immediately invalidate the AIT, as the proof depends entirely on the assumption of 
ordinality.  An important footnote here is provide by Amartya Sen: “the Arrow impossibility result 
can be readily extended to the use of individual cardinal utility functions (rather than individual 
orderings) as the arguments of collective choice rules” (Sen, 1970: 123; this result is demonstrated 
on pp 124-5 and 129-130).  So when we talk about cardinality, we need to bear in mind that that 
cardinality must be sufficient to provide interpersonal comparison, if any challenge to the AIT is to 
be launched.  Let us consider how such a challenge might be posed.   
The market mechanism is an information processing and communication device.  It receives 
information from transactions which provide signals as to the benefits and costs of some activity.  
This information is aggregated into prices which have the function of signalling to market 
participants the costs and benefits to society of an activity the agent might engage in.  Let us 
consider the information which the market receives from agents.  This information consists of many 
observations of prices and quantities transacted.  Each price actually realised is a representation of 
the purchaser’s preferences – the information that the market is able to process is that the agent 
attaches at least as much utility to the unit of the activity as to the money price.  The market never 
receives the naked preferences, but always a representation of those preferences in money terms: 
the market processes not preferences per se, but preferences in the form of demands.  Preferences 
are ordinal, yet the demand, the representation of those preferences transmitted to the market is 
cardinal; and the translation from ordinal, subjective utility to a cardinal, objective representation in 
money terms is carried out by the individual market participant himself.  The information which the 
market receives from a transaction is not only cardinal in the sense that it embodies information on 
intensity of preferences – it also embodies interpersonal comparison.  £10.51 is not only greater 
than £7.32, we know how much greater it is: £3.19.  If one agent values an item at £5.00 and 
another at £6.00, and there is one unit to allocate, the market performs an interpersonal 
comparison and awards that unit to the purchaser willing to pay the higher price.  This says little 
about the underlying utility enjoyed by the two individuals – it might be the case that the poorer 
agent, or the one with the more pressing needs elsewhere, who can only afford to offer £5.00, might 
derive a greater increment in pleasure by consuming the item.  But the budgets or endowments of 
the agents and the constellation of needs that they experience yield a socially valid, or socially 
significant, comparison of their utilities.  The preferences which act as inputs are those not the 
naked, ordinal preferences of the agents, but those preferences subject to a cardinal representation 
by comparison with money prices.  If the logic of this argument, which seems to flow naturally from 
Austrian analysis, were accepted, this would challenge the application of the AIT to market 
processes.  Given that the inputs to the market SWF are cardinal, the AIT can no longer be proved.  
There is no longer any reason why the output of the calculation device that the market constitutes 
should not be an ordering, and at the same time satisfy the four other conditions.  In particular, the 
proof would fail because the preferences shown in Table 1, above, would now be cardinal numbers.  
Cyclical social preferences would now be impossible: the worst that could happen is social 
indifference between the three outcomes.  But there is nothing irrational about that, and it would be 
impossible to prove that there would be a single decisive individual for some possible constellation 
of preferences.   
I think this says enough to indicate a possible line for future enquiry.  That inquiry would face a 
number of challenges.  Firstly, it would have to explain what was wrong with Arrow’s statement 
(1963: 110 n 50) that the market mechanism violates the rationality requirement, which “violation is 
precisely the well-known intersection of community indifference curves”.  Secondly, and perhaps 
linked to the above, the fact that the AIT does not apply, does not necessarily mean that we cannot 
prove the violation of one more of the five conditions.  For example, a Borda count is a method of 
voting which represents (though in what might be considered a rather crude way) both intensity of 
the voter’s feelings, and the social significance to be attached to his feelings.  So, arguably, the AIT 
for the reasons set out above, cannot be proved.  Nevertheless, it can certainly be shown that the 
Borda count method violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition.  And lastly, if the 
market is exempt from the AIT, then so also will be any voting method which attaches a cardinal 
representation to the voter’s preferences.  The Borda count method has just been cited as an 
example.  That one still fell foul of one of the five conditions.  But there may be other forms of voting 
which get round this problem.  For instance, it might be possible to set up quasi-markets for a range 
of issues, and allow voters to allocate a limited budget of votes to the questions that they felt most 
strongly about.  There is indeed more to say about all these points, but they would take us beyond 
the scope of this paper.   
 
7. Conclusion  
This paper has considered the treatment of Arrow by the Austrian school of economics, focusing on 
the work of Peter Boettke.  It has found that Austrian attempts to exempt market processes from 
the negative conclusions of the Arrow Impossibility Theorem are unjustified.  Moreover, references 
by Austrian writers to Buchanan’s critique of Arrow were not cogent: Buchanan’s response rested 
largely on misunderstanding and misrepresentation of what Arrow had done.  Despite these 
negative conclusions, a possible avenue for future work by Austrian writers was offered, holding out 
the prospect of erecting a defence of market forces against the AIT which might work.   
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1 This section draws on Chapter 3 of my PhD thesis (Denis, 2001: 52-75).   
2 Arrow introduces some confusion on this by referring to the wrong paper by Buchanan in the second edition 
of Social Choice and Individual Values.  In the 1963 edition Arrow adds a concluding chapter addressing the 
discussion of the AIT since the original publication of his book in 1951.  He says (1963: 103) that “[a] long series 
of distinguished critics have [sic] argued, in one form or another, that the problem of social choice has been 
incorrectly posed in this book.”  A footnote (1963: 103 n32) refers us, inter alia, to J.M. Buchanan, “Individual 
Choice in Voting and the Market,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol 62 , August, 1954, pp 334-43.  However, 
this paper by Buchanan makes no direct criticism of Arrow’s book, which is mentioned twice, in footnotes, 
with no hint that there is anything wrong with it.  It seems that this is just an error on Arrow’s part, and he 
meant the April 1954 paper, “Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets”.  The latter paper is indeed 
dedicated to refuting the AIT.   
                                                             
                                                                                                                                                                                             
3 I am grateful to Per Bylund and G.P. Manish (Bylund and Manish, 2017) for drawing my attention to this fact 
in the context of a debate about market socialism.   
